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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SARAH ANN ANOE RSON, 
Applicant- Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 19128 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, BARCO OF UTAH, STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, and SECOND 
INJURY FUND, 
Defendants- Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
The Applicant-Appellant, Sarah Ann Anderson, hereby 
submits the following Brief in reply to the Brief of Defend-
ants-Respondents, Barco of Utah and State Insurance Fund. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THAT THE PROBLEMS WITH THE RECORD 
REQUIRE THAT THIS CASE BE REMANDED 
FOR A NEW HEARING ON THE APPLICANT -
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE MEDICAL 
PANEL REPORT. 
There are a number of problems with regard to the 
1 1 "'rd 1n this case, which the Applicant-Appellant asserts 
_ltnuld cause th is case to be remanded for new proceedings. As 
ment1nned 1n the Appellant's Brief, one of the main problems is 
page 1125: 
"Defendant has done everythtnq that can 
reasonably be expectea in order to perfect 
his appeal. Under the present state of thtnos 
his contentions ai:e uni:ev1ewable. To dPny ' 
defendant a new ti:ial would be to deny him his 
right of appeal guaranteed by the New Mexico 
Constitution." 
In ai:riving at its conclusion, the Coui:t stated, at 
"In detei:rnining whethei: a new trial is to be 
granted for inability to pi:oduce a transcript, 
the coui:ts have weighed thi:ee factoi:s--whether 
the appellant has complied with all the pi:o-
edui:al i:eauii:ements in oi:der to pei:fect his 
appeal, whether the inability to obtain the 
transcript is without fault on the pai:t of 
the appellant and whethei: a substitute or 
alternative form of record may be had." 
Although these three requirements may in some cases 
be overly burdensome to the rights of appellants, in the prese",: 
case the Applicant-Appellant would clearly comply with these 
three factors. The Writ of Review was timely and properly 
filed, and the procedural steps necessary to be taken by the 
Applicant-Appellant were taken. With regard to fault, the 
Applicant-Appellant did not learn of the lack of any transcrlf'. 
until after the case was appealed, and that one of the part10 
had indicated that such was the case. No fault can be attrih!'· 
to any actions of the Applicant-Appellant. 
With reg a rd to the l as t fa ct or , a comp 1 et e re co nc' ' 
tion of the record of the proceeding would be next to 1mP"'''' 
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rnai w0ulrl in essence require a complete new trial. This is 
by the fact that the Order in this case was signed 
acrl issued by Mr. Timothy Allen, who was the attorney for one of 
the parties previously. The original judge, Judge Foley, has 
since retired and no longer has any authority. Thus, there is 
nc reviewing agency who can determine the appropriateness of a 
substituted record as the case now sits. Additionally, there 
would have been the cross-examination of the Medical Panel, and 
the confrontation of them of medical evidence and tests which 
they had previously not had in their possession. Thus, there is 
no substitute or alternative form of the record below which can 
be put together and subscribed to at this time. 
Many courts and jurisdictions have granted a new trial 
as a matter of right due to the inability of the providing of a 
record to allow a meaningful review of the proceedings below. 
This is especially so when there is no fault or attributing 
cause to the Appellant. However, even if this Court should not 
adopt such a rule, at least the court should grant a new trial in 
the circumstances set forth in the State vs. Moore. Therefore, 
this case falling within the confines of the analysis of State 
a new trial should be granted. 
There are other problems with regard to the current 
otate of the record. One of the claims of the Defendants in their 
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Brief is that there is no evidence in the rPcord which rlues, 
than support the ruling by the Commission. However, for some 
unknown reason, the reports of Dr. McQueen, the treating physi-
cian, which were supplied to the Commission are not in the fil-, 
See specifically Letter of Counsel, indicating enclosed reponi, 
which is in the record, but the reports are not. See Record 3-
page 116. 
There are two further references in the record tu ca• 
ters which should appear in the record, but do not. In the Cr-
signed by Judge Allen, Record at page 136, Judge Allen stated: 
"It appears from the file that the Applicant's counsel was 
advised of this fact at the termination of the hearing but so 
the record may be cleared an Order to that effect will issue," 
However, although the Writ of Review directed the Industrial 
Commission to forward on to this Court transcripts of all 
proceedings, and the entire record of all other matters 111 tr' 
file in this case, this record contains nothing which would 
support that statement by Judge Allen. 
Another curiosity in the record in this case is poi" 
out by the Order Denying the Motion for Review done by the 
entire Industrial Commission, locatPd at page 142 of the Re''' 
In the next-to-last paragraph, the Commission indicates tha' 
"has reviewed the file and transcript in the above-entitled 
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However, there never was a transcript made of the 
hearing on the Objections to the Medical Panel Report. Further, 
1 f the record in this case constitutes the entire file as 
reviewed by the Commission, the safeguards of the prior review, 
as well as the independant decision of the Commission, as stated 
by the Defendants in their Brief, did not obtain. 
In this case the Applicant-Appellant is seeking compen-
sation benefits of both permanent and partial nature, as well as 
temporary total disability benefits. Additionally, there are 
substantial medical bills involved. The dispute between the 
doctors concerns itself with the injury to the knee of the 
Applicant-Appellant. Dr. Hess, who constituted the Medical 
Panel, was of the opinion that most of the problem with the 
Applicant-Appellant's knee since the accident was "chondromalacia 
patella with degenerative medial and lateral menisci secondary 
to subluxating patellae," not industrial, and not aggravated by 
the industrial injury. He therefore felt that the two subsequent 
surgeries on the knee were not related to an industrial injury. 
He also set temporary total as approximately three months after 
thP in1t1al surgery, being based upon the average that an 
rd1nary person would encounter from the injury. Dr. McQueen, 
the contrary, was of the opinion that the industrial injury 
was a substantial aggravating circumstance to the knee problems, 
-7-
and therefore all of the problems after the accident 
related to the industrial injury. As such, there would be or 
additional two years of temporary total disability, additior,a; 
payments for the 10% disability attributable to the chondroma;; 
cia, and coverage for the medical expenses for the operations 
incurred by the Applicant-Appellant. 
Therefore, in order for there to be a full resoluttc 
of the issues, as well as a meaningful review of the Industria: 
Commission's resolutions of factual issues and medical opinior" 
involved, this Court should remand the matter back to the 
Industrial Commission for a new hearing on Appl icant-Appellar.t'· 
Objection to the Medical Panel Report. 
POINT II: THAT THERE ARE SUFFICIENT CONCERNS WITH 
REGARD TO JUDGE FOLEY THAT A NEW TRIAL 
SHOULD BE GRANTED 
It is admitted by all of the parties that certain 
actions taken by Judge Foley were improper. It i S the Appl !Ci" 
Appellant's claims that a new trial and hearing should be 
granted based upon his conduct. These arguments are set frJlt'. 
in Applicant-Appellant's Brief and concern actual bias and tr" 
avoiding of the appearance of bias. 
As stated in Defendants' Brief. at page 6, it was 
improper for Judge Foley to have contacted the attorney for 
Applicant-Appellant concerning the case, and his intentions 
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t0 ruling. Further, Judge Foley did not rule as he 
indicated he was going to do, which indication was forwarded by 
counsel to the other parties. Then, at the time of the hearing, 
he denied that he had ever made the call, and told counsel that 
he was incorrect for so stating. Further, he indicated that he 
had a practice of never going against the Medical Panel Report. 
Finally, he refused to make any ruling, despite repeated requests 
by counsel for the Applicant-Appellant. 
The cases cited by the Defendant in its Brief do not 
compel the conclusion that a new trial should not be granted. In 
Christiansen vs. Christiansen, 422 P. 2d 534, 18 Utah 2d 315 
(1967) the issue was the sufficiency of the Affidavit of Bias 
which had been filed. Further, of the two grounds cited, one 
the Court held that the lower Court statement concerning reject-
ing the Stipulation of Divorce Action was proper, and second,con-
cerning a misunderstanding with Plaintiff's counsel, such was 
not a fact or reason specifically stated to show any bias or 
prejudice. In the case of bar, there were explicit statements 
which showed more than a mere misunderstanding between counsel 
and the Judge. There was a specific denial of a conversation to 
which only the Judge and counsel were privy. This goes directly 
rhe cred1tab1lity of counsel for the Applicant-Appellant, and 
il1ereby would shade into any argument or position taken by the 
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Applicant-Appellant. 
The other case cited by the Defendants, Lepasiote_:;_::_:: 
Dinsdale et al, 242 P. 2d 297, 121 Utah 359 ( 1952), also does 
not dictate the affirmance of the act ions of Judge Foley and v. 
Industrial Commission. In Lepasiotes, supra, this Court aff1 ,., 
a judgment where there was ample evidence to sustain the Findi·c 
and Decree, even though "the court evinced a somewhat hostile 
attitute towards the Defendants and their counsel." The case 
was mainly decided upon the timeliness of the filing of an 
Affidavit of Prejudice. The matters raised in the Affidavit, 
which was filed after the trial had begun, had to do with 
matters existing and known for a long time prior to the commer.r-
ment of the trial. 
The Defendants in their Brief, at pages 9 and 10, quc· 
from Lepasiotes, supra. However, the quoted portion of the ca,-
does not fully explain the point of the case, nor its 
The Court continued, after that quoted by the Defendants, at cc. 
297, 121 Utah, page 361: 
"This does not imply that had the affidavit 
been timely made a decree adverse to the party 
who claimed prejudice would nevertheless be 
sustained if there was evidence to support 
it. There may be cases where under the 
evidence no conclusion could be reached other 
than against the party who claims preJudice. 
In such cases, we could hold that prejudice, 
if any, could not have been in any part 
responsible for the judgment. But in other 
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cases where two or more views or interpret-
ations of the evidence or the credibility 
or lack of credibility accorded to witnesses 
might turn the case one way or the other, 
there is present the possibility that the 
prejudice of the judge, if any, could have 
influenced his judgment. In such cases we 
might, if the affidavit were timely filed 
or even if it were not, desire to reverse 
the case in order to avoid any possibility 
that prejudice influenced the decision." 
The case at bar squarely fits into the caveat stated 
by the Court to its narrow ruling in Lepasiotes. The administra-
t1ve law Judge Foley had to choose between one of two opinions, 
both by competent doctors. The Judge could have found in 
accordance with either one, based upon their demeanor, the 
pursuasiveness of their credentials, or their possession and 
familiarity with all of the relevent information and evidence. 
Here there is a possibility of prejudice, and the administrative 
law judge found in accordance with his expressed bias--in favor 
of Medical Panels and against the position advocated by the 
attorney for the Applicant-Appellant. 
The Defendants also assert in essence three grounds 
for denying a new hearing based upon the bias and prejudice of 
the administrative law judge. These are procedural or affirma-
1ve type defenses. The first concerns itself with the timeli-
c,c; "' the claim of bias, citing Lepasiotes. However, here 
thPre was no knowledge or notice prior to the hearing of any 
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bias or prejudice on behalf of Judge Foley. Such was nut 
discovered until the start of the hearing. Apparently, the 
Defendents would have the Applicant-Appellant make the claim 
after the hearing had commenced, which would still, in theor, 
put Appli- cant-Appellant in the bar stated in Lepasiotes. Bu· 
at the point of discovery, which was part way through the 
hearing, it would appear that such a claim should best be ra 15 , 
in a forum other than the particular hearing in progress. 
The next affirmative defense to the request for a 
trial is in the nature of estoppel--that since counsel for tr.e 
Applicant requested a ruling, Applicant-Appellant cannot 
claim error. See Brief of Defendant, page 9. However, until 
such time as there was a ruling, there was no issue to be 
reviewed. Any claim at that point would be interlocutory, and 
the procedural requirements require an Order to be made and 
entered before a review can be had. Further, as it is noted 
the record, Judge Foley never did issue a ruling or a dec1swc 
in this case. 
The final contention made is that any error was 
harmless. This was stated in the Brief of the Defendants'" 
page 6, that since there was a hearing, there was no error. 
However, this claim goes to the heart of the issue of fairne 
and efficacy of the hearing that was had. As noted in Vali 
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convalescent and Care Institute vs. Industrial Commission of 
649 P. 2d 33 (Utah 1982) and Marshall vs. Jerrica, Inc., 
446 u .s. 238, 100 S. Ct. 1610 ( 1980), cited and quoted in 
Appellant's Brief at pages 6 and 7, due process requires the 
actuality of an unbiased and impartial tribunal, as well as the 
appearance of one. 
Therefore, as stated here and in Appellant's Brief, 
there is sufficient concern and evidence of bias and prejudice 
on the part of Judge Foley, or at least the appearance of such, 
that this Court should remand this case back down to the Indust-
rial Commission for a full and fair hearing before a new adminis-
trative law judge. 
POINT III: THAT THE IMPROPRIETY OF JUDGE ALLEN 
RULING IN THIS CASE REQUIRES A 
REMAND OF THESE PROCEEDINGS. 
It appears to be the Defendants' claim that the action 
of Judge Allen entering the Order in this case is either merely 
a ministerial act or is harmless, and remand should not be 
had. However, the claim for a ministerial act is nowhere 
supported in the record. As stated by Judge Allen in his Order, 
record paqe 136, and quoted in the Brief of the Defendant on 
I Clq":;' 1 l: 
"It appears from the file that the Appli-
cant's counsel was advised of this fact at 
the termination of the hearing, but so that 
the record may be clear an Order to that 
effect will be issued." 
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However, the Writ of Review in this case reguirec ,,, 
Industrial Commission to forward to this Court the entire r 11 , 
Nowhere in that record can any indication be found that Judge 
Foley advised Applicant's counsel of his ruling, let alone 
attempted in any manner to issue a ruling. Further, of cours,,, 
Judge Allen entered certain in essence findings in his Order, 
concerning what happened and transpired at the hearing. These 
findings and statements are not ministrial, and in fact have 
fixed and declared the rights of this Applicant-Appellant as 
well as constitute the Order to be reviewed. 
If this were a case where the ful 1 and complete reccr: 
of the proceedings was available, and where the judge had 
prepared specific findings and conclusions and an Order, but 
through some disability had not signed them, the signing of sa. 
Order might be a ministrial act. But it is not a rninistrial i:· 
to state what happened, to set and determine rights where thee'· 
is no clear indication of the judge's intent and ruling. 
The claim that any error would be harmless raises 
again the issue as to the lack of record and the bias and 
prejudice of Judge Foley. It leaves unanswered the reasu11 w 
Judge Foley refused for over six months, not withstanrlinq a 
written request, to issue a ruling or an Order in this case. 
Further, it is clearly wrong and a spec1f1c statutory reguir,: 
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rhat no attorney for any party in a proceeding shall sit or act 
dS a judge in the case. See Section 78-7-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
J953, as amended. 
In the case of Amos Treat and Company vs. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 306 F. 2d 260 (D. C. Cir. Ct., 1962) a 
Mr. Cullen had been director of the Securities and Exchange 
commission's Division of Corporate Finance and was 
for the initiation, conduct and supervision of proceedings. 
Mr. Cullen held that position while an informal investigation 
was in progress against the Plaintiff in the case. Subse-
quently, Mr. Cullen became a member of the Commission and 
ultimately sat on a panel which voted to initiate action against 
the Plaintiffs. The Court there upheld the jurisdiction of the 
Court to resolve the issue, and directed that there be no 
proceedings or matters initiated wherein Mr. Cullen could 
participate as a Commission member. In arriving at that conclu-
s1on, the Court quoted from Trans World Airlines vs. Civil 
Aeronautics Board, 254 F. 2d 90 (D. c. Cir. Ct., 1958) at page 
"The fundamental requirements of fairness 
in the performance of such functions require 
at least that one who participates in a 
case on behalf of any party, whether 
actively or merely formally by being on 
pleadings or briefs, take no part in the 
decision of that case by any tribunal on 
which he may thereafter sit." 
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Here again is that dual concern with regard tu 
actual fairness and propriety, as wel 1 as the of 
fairness and propriety. On this point, both grounrls dictate 
that Judge Allen's Order be set aside and ruled improper, whic• 
requires that this case be remanded back for a new hearing on 
the Applicant-Appellant's Objection to the Medical Panel Repor:. 
POINT IV: THAT THE "INDEPENDANT DECISION" 
AND EVALUATION BY THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION AS A BODY IS NOT 
SUFFICIENT IN THIS CASE. 
On pages 13 and 14 of the Defendants' Brief, great 
issue is taken with regard to ,this Applicant having been provtd' 
with the safeguard of a three-man panel of the Industrial 
Commission who evaluated the evidence and made an independant 
decision thereon. Further, the Defendants indicated that the 
Findings, Conclusion and Order are advisory on said Commission 
when a Motion for Review is filed. That safeguard having 
occurred, the award should be firm. 
We at this point cannot determine what, if anything, 
the Industrial Commission reviewed with regard to this case, 
The court reporter was unable to find any of his notes or 
recordings with regard to the hearing in question, anrl theref·"· 
could not produce a transcript. Presumably, no independafll 
transcript was made for the Commission, and thus they have 
seen a transcript of the proceedings, let alone viewed the 
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nPsses and the evidence presented. The basis of their decision 
must somehow be gleaned from the record on appeal, as the 
industrial Commission, by writ, was directed to provide the 
entire file in this case. A review of this record, no matter 
how thoroughly done, cannot qualify as an independant review 
such as to alleviate, make groundless, or right any of the 
objections to the proceedings and prior findings. 
This claim by the Defendants leaves untouched and 
unanswered the prior problems of the conduct of Judge Foley and 
Judge Allen, let alone the appearance of fairness in this case. 
Additionally, this Applicant-Appellant has the right to have the 
actions that occurred in the Industrial Commission reviewed for 
their lawfulness. See Section 35-1-83, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
There is still no complete record, let alone transcript, in 
order for there to be a meaningful review as contemplated in the 
statutes, as well that dictated in the federal and state Constitu-
tions. 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that based upon 
Jack of a full and complete record herein, and based upon 
''t; 11 which does appear of recored in this case, that this Court 
t1ould vacate the Order of Judge Allen, Judge Foley and the 
-17-
Industrial Commission, and remand this matter back down tr-, t>,e 
Industrial Commission for a hearing by a neutral and 
administrative law judge on the issue of the Objection to the 
Medical Panel Report. 
DATED this day of September, 1984. 
THOM D. ROBERTS of 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
Attorney for Applicant-Appellant 
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